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ABSTRACT
T
his paper discusses, from a developing country’s perspective, the impact
and implications of the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  It does so by putting them into the
context of relevant trends of globalization and assessing the political and institutional
setting within the WTO framework.  The paper thereby provides comprehensive
background information on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs) and the resulting international intellectual property regime, including its
characteristics, preconditions, the actors and interests involved, and it provides an
institutional analysis.  The main finding is that the constraints on intellectual property
regulation in developing countries are twofold.  First, the TRIPs Agreement has an
unprecedented impact on national regulations by imposing global minimum standards
for types of intellectual property protection, the scope and the duration of those
regulations along with rules for enforcement.  Second, the emergence of the TRIPs
Agreement has made intellectual property protection an important issue in today’s
global production networks established by transnational corporations.  Therefore, in
the case of intellectual property protection, the continuous internationalization of
production and the knowledge-based economy (as major trends in today’s global
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economy) has become the fundamental driver for increased attention to national
regulation in developing countries owing to increased technological competition and
investment in research and development.  However, when analysing the emergence
and impacts of the TRIPs Agreement, both economic and political integration
appear to be deeply interlinked.  Mounting exports and investment flows from
the industrialized countries confronted their Governments with the demand for
cross-border enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs).  The weak and
fragmented World Intellectual Property Organization system was thus bypassed by
introducing the IPR issue into the talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, which offered the best institutional platform to push intellectual property
protection forward, because industrialized countries could offer rewards quid pro quo
for the commitments made by developing countries.  The specific characteristics of
the established international intellectual property regime within the WTO framework
made its global impact feasible, since WTO offers widespread membership and the
option to enforce compliance through its Dispute Settlement Body.  On the other
hand, besides national intellectual property systems, the TRIPs Agreement also
changed the global trade and investment environment fundamentally with regard to
the strengthening of owner rights on inventions and innovation.  As the outlined
trend of internationalization of research and development indicates, the paper assumes
that the TRIPs Agreement facilitates further fragmentation of production in
technology-intensive sectors and hence offers further opportunities for potential host
countries, because adjusted intellectual property systems and better prospects for
enforcement may generally encourage transnational corporations to relocate the very
intellectual property-sensitive parts of production.  Throughout the paper basic
theoretical concepts are discussed in order to clarify the actual developments, and
illustrative examples are used, such as the internationalization of research and
development and the unilateral and bilateral efforts of the United States for cross-border
enforcement of IPRs.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights came into
force in 1995, the protection of intellectual property has become an issue of specific
attention from a developing country’s perspective.  Until then, national intellectual property
regulation was often subject to strategic industrialization policies aimed at facilitating
imitation, or it was of no concern at all.  This situation has changed with the TRIPs
Agreement.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The developed countries first pushed for strengthening IPRs in the Tokyo round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), because they increasingly perceived
that enforcement was inadequate and obviously looked for another forum to solve the
problem besides the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  Industrialized
countries wanted to find a solution, because strong domestic interests within the exporting
industries evolved as did general concerns about the loss of research and development
(R and D) investments due to imitation in developing countries.  Governments faced
a dilemma with regard to the traditionally national coverage of intellectual property
regulation and the transnational reach of innovating industries.  Consequently, they used the
GATT platform to implement internationally enforceable rules on intellectual property
protection and to offer concessions in other areas of the Uruguay round negotiations as quid
pro quo.  Nonetheless, by accepting the TRIPs provisions, developing countries made
considerable commitments with regard to the cost of immediate implementation and
potential transfer payments to intellectual property-holding firms abroad.
The major impact of the TRIPs Agreement is the harmonization of national
intellectual property regulation with global “minimum standards in virtually all areas of
intellectual property protection” (Maskus, 2000, p. 26) including rules for enforcement and
administration in all WTO member countries.  The institutional environment of GATT and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) made this unprecedented intervention in national
regulation feasible.
This paper interlinks the globalization process, particularly the internationalization
of production and the emergence of a knowledge-based global economy, with the political
dimensions of the TRIPs Agreement within the WTO framework.  The next sections are
organized as follows:  section 2 outlines the background of IPRs and the debate, and
discusses and subsequently illustrates the internationalization of production and the
knowledge-based economy by focusing on the trend of the internationalization of R and D.
Section 3 puts the TRIPs Agreement into its political-economic context.  It analyses first the
weaknesses of the WIPO system and the political economy of cross-border IPR
enforcement; second, it points out the complex position of developing countries in the
negotiations; and third, it assesses the main characteristics and elements of the new
international intellectual property regime, which goes beyond the TRIPs Agreement.  That
regime is expanded through an increasing number of preferential bilateral and regional trade
agreements.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TRENDS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY
(a) Regulation of intellectual property rights
The term IPRs refers to the legal instrument for protecting the ownership of an
immaterial good:  creations of the mind resulting from invention and innovation.1 An IPR,
e.g., a patent, copyright or industrial design,2 entitles the owner to capitalize exclusively on
its commercial use for a certain period.  The paper focuses on patents,3 which are
subsequently also referred to as intellectual property.  The reason is that patents are the most
relevant type of intellectual property for the creation of technology.
As a static set of rules, IPRs “are just one of the pieces that form a national system
of intellectual property protection.” (Primo Braga and others, 2000, p. 4).  Naturally, it takes
more than the sole legal status of IPRs to ensure that rights can be granted by the State.  The
lack of enforcement is often the most criticized feature of the system in developing
countries.  Especially in newly industrialized countries, the focus is on intellectual property
protection, because the production and consumption of goods and services increasingly
involves new technology, i.e., knowledge which can be commercially exploited.  Maskus
(2000, p. 3) identifies three key elements of the intellectual property system:  “standards”,
“limitations” and “enforcement”.  Standards determine the scope of the IPR.  Hence,
limitations additionally restrict the extent of protection.  They include the period of
protection, compulsory licensing to ensure the use of certain technology and competition
rules to contain monopolistic tendencies.  Enforcement comprises all “administrative and
judicial actions by public authorities to safeguard the rights granted” (Maskus, 2000, p. 3).
For all WTO members, TRIPs includes these three key elements as obligations to
implement.
Intellectual property regulation, including all components of the intellectual
property system, is conventionally a concern of national policymaking.  The Government
1 Concerning the application of IPRs, Hoekman and Kostecki (2001,  p. 276) emphasize the importance of
innovation, because it is mostly related to the commercial and “costly” part of R and D, which turns the
invention into a product.
2 According to a widely quoted categorization of IPRs in Primo Braga and others (2000, p. 4), patents are within
industrial property, the first of four “types of IPR”, and can be found in both international treaties and in some
national intellectual property provisions.  They include utility models, geographical indications, industrial
designs and trademarks.  The second type, literary and artistic property, namely copyrights and neighbouring
rights, protect the authors of printing, audio and video entertainment, software and broadcasting.  The third
type, trade secrets, refers to undisclosed business information.  The fourth type refers to sui generis protection
and includes plant breeders’ rights, database protection and integrated circuits as specific instruments of
protection not covered by other types.  All types of IPRs can be found in different agreements of the World
Intellectual Property Organization and nearly all are included in TRIPs.
3 The use of the term intellectual property refers mainly to patents.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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intervenes in the distribution of gains arising from inventions and R and D in order to avoid
an assumed underinvestment in the “production of knowledge”, as argued by Arrow (1962,
citing Primo Braga and Fink, 1999, p. 2).  The “economic rationale” for policymakers to
provide IPRs derives from the character of knowledge, because it is “non-rival in nature”,
i.e., the marginal cost of its distribution is zero.
However, the concept of intellectual property protection has been contested,
especially after the emergence of the TRIPs Agreement.  While the proponents are worried
about the absence of incentives for innovation, which can lead to welfare losses, the critics
focus on the reduced resources for the public, i.e., higher consumer prices, which are
comparable to a tax.4 Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, p. 277) note that each Government
could choose its “optimal mix” between rent-granting and free access to knowledge for its
own territory using IPRs.  As Primo Braga and others (2000) show, the strength of
intellectual property protection mainly correlated with the level economic development in
the 1970s (figure 1).
Figure 1.  Judging the strength of protection of intellectual property rights
by the level of economic development
Source:  Primo Braga and others (2000).  Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development,
Discussion Paper No. 412 (Washington, D.C., World Bank).
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4 With regard to developing countries, the United Kingdom-based Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
(CIPR, 2003,  p. 6) and Correa (2000) have a more critical view about Western standards of intellectual
property protection and its global implementation through the TRIPs Agreement.  Maskus (2000 and 2005) is
the most prominent scholar among proponents of, broadly speaking, strengthened intellectual property
protection.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
52
However, this freedom of choice is restricted nowadays owing to the introduction
of minimum standards through the TRIPs Agreement.  Imposed norms through
a multilateral regime, as discussed in the next chapter, constrain national policy options in
intellectual property regulation.  Consequently, the agreement has bolstered the debate over
IPRs.  There is a widely shared view among economists that a uniform application of
TRIPs Agreement standards and their implementation is problematic as regards the level of
economic development and institutional capacities.5
Therefore, while generally strengthened intellectual property systems in the newly
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia could enable further success in attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI) and enhancing their own technological advance, in the case of the
least developed countries (LDCs) these measures might be inappropriate, as a study of
Hoekman and others (2004) indicates.  According to the state of development, they suggest
(see table 1) adjusted IPR strategies within a comprehensive policy package concerning
international technology transfer (see next section).
Table 1.  A “rule-of-thumb” typology and examples of international technology
transfer policies in developing countries
Trade in




 direct knowledge property
movement
technology
investment (licensing)  rights policies
Low- Liberal access Inward Improve Basic Incentives for Basic
income investment information protection and education education;
countries promotion flows about minimum abroad improve
public domain standards infrastructure;
and mature reduce entry
technologies barriers
Lower Liberal access Inward Improve Wider scope Incentives for Research and
middle investment information; of protection; education development
income promotion limited employ abroad and support




Upper Liberal access No active No active Full TRIPs Encourage Research and
middle policy policy two-way development
income mobility support
countries policies
Source: Extracted from Bernhard M. Hoekman and others (2004). Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3332 (Washington,
D.C., World Bank), p. 32.
5 See Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001; Primo Braga and others, 2000; Hoekman and others, 2004; CIPR, 2003;
Correa, 2000.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(b)  Internationalization of production and knowledge-based economy
Both intellectual property regulation in general and intellectual property protection
in particular have become a matter of concern beyond national borders:  for business and
politics in industrialized countries and subsequently in developing countries.  This paper
argues that the emergence of the TRIPs Agreement and its implications for developing
countries are strongly linked to globalization.  At the same time, the TRIPs Agreement and
its global impact are also a crucial part of globalization.
Globalization is a term of wide comprehension; although it is extensively used, it
is also contested at the same time.  The view taken in this paper distinguishes between
economic and political integration in trade and finance as two major forces in the whole
process of globalization.  A general account of globalization found in the White Paper on
Globalization and Poverty (2000) produced by the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland explains economic globalization and puts the political
aspects of globalization loosely beside it:
In fact, globalization means the growing interdependence and interconnectedness
of the modern world.… The increased ease of movement of goods, services,
capital, people and information across national borders is rapidly creating a single
global economy.  The process is driven by technological advance and reductions in
the cost of international transactions, which spread technology and ideas, raise the
share of trade in world production, and increase the mobility of capital.  It is also
reflected in the diffusion of global norms and values, the spread of democracy and
the proliferation of global agreements and treaties…(cited in Weiss, 2002, p. 140)
Although the definition gives a comprehensive account, it is important to
emphasize that both integration processes are intertwined with each other in the context of
the TRIPs Agreement.  Today’s state of economic globalization and foremost liberalization
can be understood only with regard to the governing multilateral institutions in trade and
finance and the involvement of national Governments (see Rodrik, 1999; Krasner, 2000).
On the other hand, most of the debate on globalization focuses on the diminishing scope for
national policymaking due to exogenous constraints and the emergence of transnational
corporations (TNCs) as transnational actors (Strange, 2000; Frieden and Rogowski, 1996).
Today’s economic globalization has introduced two trends, which are important in
order to identify the implications of the TRIPs Agreement for national intellectual property
protection in the context of economic development:  the internationalization of production
and the development of a global knowledge-based economy, which combined have led to
the internationalization of R and D.  All three trends are introduced in turn below.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(i) Internationalization of production
The above term describes the process of dispersion of production through arm’s
length trade, licensing6 and most importantly FDI by TNCs, which seek new markets,
resources, lower production costs and efficiency (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003, pp. 5-6).
As outlined, technology (most importantly, information and communications) and liberal
trade and investment policies have helped to reduce transaction costs and thereby have
facilitated outsourcing of parts of production by TNCs to developing countries.  FDI, i.e.,
the establishment of an affiliate abroad and the related internalization of technology
transfer, has become the most important channel of internationalization of production.  In
effect, the inflow of FDI has grown rapidly in the last two decades, especially in the ESCAP
region.  Rajan (2005, p. 5) points out that “FDI has been found the most stable source of
external finance for developing countries in the Asian and Pacific region”.
Rajan (2005, pp. 9-10) emphasizes that in developing countries the growth of the
“old”, trade-based type of “production fragmentation” in consumer goods industries, such
as garments and footwear, is outpaced by the “new”, investments-based type involving
sectors such as “airliners, computers, semiconductors, automobiles and many other
products”.  Thus, the share of production by TNC affiliates producing on a “hi-tech” level is
rising in developing countries.  This trend offers potential gains for host countries in terms
of economic growth and technology spillovers.  The role of TNCs as actors in and sources
of global trade and investment cannot be overestimated, since they account for “around
two-thirds of world trade for the latter half of the 1990s” (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 153).
(ii) The knowledge-based economy
The second characteristic of today’s economic globalization highlights
the increasing importance of knowledge in the economy and society:  the so-called
knowledge-based economy.7 The World Development Report 1998/1999 (World Bank,
(1998, pp. 6-8) argues that knowledge has become the crucial factor for development, as it
has become for the global economy with its implications for R and D expenditure:
The creation of technical knowledge – as measured by patents issued, although not
all technical knowledge patented – is expanding rapidly.  [Within only four years,
the number of patent applications worldwide increased from 1.4 million in 1989 to
6 Licensing is another important channel of technology transfer.  With reference to international technology
transfer (ITT), Hoekman and others (2004, p. 3) summarize:  “A third major channel of ITT is direct trade in
knowledge via technology licensing.  This may occur within firms, among joint ventures, or between unrelated
firms.  Licensing and FDI are often substitutes.  Which form is preferable to technology owners depends on
many factors, including the strength of IPRs protection”.
7 The term gained relevance through the OECD report entitled “The Knowledge-Based Economy” (Paris,
OECD, 1996).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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2 million in 1993.  Continuous innovation, automation, and competition in the
creation and use of knowledge have shortened product cycles in many industries.
UNCTAD (2005, p. 99) summarizes the implications for developing countries:
Technology is advancing faster than ever before.  Developing countries that fail to
build capabilities enabling them to participate in the evolving global networks of
knowledge creation risk falling further behind in terms of competitiveness as well
as economic and social development.
As OECD (2000, p. 27) states, innovation and technological change are the key
drivers for economic growth.  OECD (2000, p. 32) also sees evidence that “more than
before, innovation is now at the core of economic activity”.  The evolution of R and D
expenditures over time support this view:  total R and D spending worldwide increased
from $438 billion in 1991 to $576 billion in 1996 to $677 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2005, 
p. 105).  Private spending amounted to $449.8 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 105),
accounting for 66.5 per cent of worldwide R and D spending, and therefore it should be
considered as an important source of national R and D activities (table 2).  The share is
constantly growing in most of the OECD countries (OECD, 2000, p. 28).
The “knowledge gap” (World Bank, 1998) or “technology gap” (UNCTAD, 2005)
is still of concern for researchers, because the geographic concentration of R and D remains
pronounced (table 2).  In this regard, TNCs, mainly from the industrialized countries, can
form the missing link for improved accession to the increasing global production and
private financing of R and D, as argued below.
International technology transfer again gained attention among researchers and
policymakers with introduction of the TRIPs Agreement, since the approach focuses on all
relevant policies that enhance the ability of a developing country to absorb foreign
technology, including intellectual property protection (see Hoekman and others, 2004;
Primo Braga and Fink, 1999).  In the post-TRIPs Agreement debate, studies focused on
imitation as a channel of transfer, which nevertheless basically ceased to exist as a policy
option with the full implementation of the TRIPs Agreement (see Davis, 2005, p. 7).
In the age of globalization, FDI, trade and licensing nowadays form legitimate and
growing options for having a stake in the global network involving foreign technology.
National policies that take a proactive approach may provide opportunities for countries to
benefit from an integrated global economy.  In contrast, a defensive approach to the new
constraints in national intellectual property regulation may lead to losses of national
welfare, for example, in terms of (potential) investments and constrained accession to
foreign high-technology goods, such as pharmaceuticals.  The sole implementation of the
TRIPs Agreement without using “wiggle room” (Holmes, 2004,  p. 27) and tailoring
regulation to domestic conditions as well as the lack of adaptation to the new global
standards and insufficient enforcement may have unfavourable effects.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(iii) Internationalization of R and D
The  World Investment Report:  Transnational Corporations and the Inter-
nationalization of R&D (UNCTAD, 2005) investigates a relatively new development, which
can be interpreted as a result of both of the previously outlined trends of economic
globalization:  the so-called internationalization of R and D.  It highlights an outstanding
new opportunity for developing countries, primarily NICs, to participate in the global
creation of knowledge and technological progress.  It can be interpreted as the final step of
the internationalization and geographic fragmentation of production, because it is a very
sensible part of economic activity with vital investments at stake involving highly skilled
personnel.  Furthermore, it emphasizes both the importance of TNCs as sources of foreign
Table 2.  Home economies of the 700 largest research and development-spending firms
of the world, 2003; and research and development spending, 2002








Rank research and Economy research and
development development
spenders
1 296 42.3 United States 276.2 194.4
2 154 22.0 Japan 133.0 92.3
3 53 7.6 Germany 50.2 34.8
4 39 5.6 United Kingdom 29.3 19.6
5 35 5.0 France 32.5 20.6
6 20 2.9 Switzerland n.a. n.a.
7 15 2.1 Sweden 9.4 7.3
8 10 1.4 Republic of Korea 13.8 10.4
9 8 1.1 Denmark n.a. n.a.
10 8 1.1 Taiwan Province 6.5 4.0
of China
…
22 2 0.3 China 15.6 9.5
…
28 1 0.1 Hong Kong, China 1.0 0.3
…
700 100.0 Total/ World 676.5 449.8
Source: Extracted from UNCTAD (2005). World Investment Report 2005:  Transnational Corporations
and the Internationalization of R&D (New York and Geneva), pp. 105 and 121.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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capital and technology as well as connectors to the “global technology and innovation
networks led by these firms” (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 99).
The report (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 99) explains that, in relation to the fast-proceeding
offshoring of services in the past few years, R and D is evolving from the “least
internationalized function[s] of TNCs” to the fastest fragmenting function, such as in the
case of German TNCs, which invested more abroad in the 1990s than in the preceding
50 years (table 3).
Table 3. German research and development-related FDI abroad, 1995-2003
Year
FDI stock in research and Employment of research
development foreign Number of research and and development
affiliates abroad development foreign foreign affiliates
(Millions of affiliates (Thousands of
United States dollars) United States dollars)
1995 43.2 20 2
1996 83.8 25 2
1997 133.8 31 3
1998 199.6 55 5
1999 467.7 59 6
2000 647.7 89 9
2001 630.0 105 10
2002 934.3 73 11
2003 891.4 78 11
Source: UNCTAD (2005). World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the
Internationalization of R&D (New York and Geneva), p. 124.
In general, R and D activities in developing countries emerge now from simple
adaptation processes to research, whereas TNCs are seeking “access to foreign pools of
research talents” (UNCTAD, 2005,  p. 99).  This global development is fastest in Asia
(UNCTAD, 2005, p. 100).  As Weiss (2002, p. 131) points out, Singapore was successful in
adopting a proactive strategy, which combines tax incentives and direct grants for R and D
with the “provision of a high technology infrastructure based on public sector research
institutes and universities”.  Nowadays, 50 per cent of Singapore’s R and D is conducted by
foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 125).  Regarding the intellectual property system and
the rule of law, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, emphasized the
strategy of his country in an interview with a German news magazine,8 noting that
Singapore offers an advanced legal system with effective courts and strong protection of
intellectual property in order to attract investors from technology-sensitive firms, especially
in the pharmaceutical industry.
8 “Es ist dumm, Angst zu haben”, Der Spiegel, No. 32, 2005, pp. 89-91.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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UNCTAD (2005, pp. 99, 102) has emphasized that R and D can be found at the
peak of the so-called pyramid of innovation.  Thus, it embodies FDI with the most value
added in terms of technological spillovers.  However, it requires ambitious host-country
features, among which “stable and efficient legal and governance systems” should be
included (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 116).  UNCTAD data (2005, p. 125) from 1993 to 2002 show
that “R&D expenditure of foreign affiliates in host countries worldwide” has risen from
$29 billion or 10 per cent of global business R and D to $67 billion, or 16 per cent.  The
outlined trend draws attention again to general reasoning on factors attracting FDI.
Concerning intellectual property protection, UNCTAD (2005, p. 165) concludes:
The design of IPR regimes [national intellectual property systems] may play a less
direct but nevertheless important role.  For instance, providing effective means of
IPR protection may act as a signaling device to international investors.
Strengthening the regime may show that the country is willing to “play by the
rules” and provide a hospitable investment climate.
3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRIPs AGREEMENT:  TOWARDS
A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
(a) The WIPO system and unilateral pressure:  the emergence of
cross-border intellectual property protection
This section takes a look at the historical preconditions of the TRIPs Agreement
regime and outlines its weaknesses.  It thereby stresses the political economy of cross-border
intellectual property protection and the domestic interests involved, and it outlines the
related unilateral and bilateral attempts by industrialized countries to enforce IPRs
internationally.
When IPRs were included in the Uruguay round in 1986, intellectual property
protection had already been of international concern for over 100 years.  In the late
nineteenth century, the newly industrialized countries in Europe and the United States had
already been working for decades with national patent systems.  At this time, the “ability to
tailor the nature of their regimes [intellectual property systems] to their own circumstances
was unconstrained” as the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2003,  p.18)
emphasizes.  Owing to their territorial character, the recognition of IPRs of non-nationals,
i.e., importers, became an issue with the increasing level of international trade, because
intellectual property protection was mainly part of strategic discrimination and
protectionism.  When trade rose sharply because of the industrial revolution in Europe and
the United States, the profits of the exporting industries, which had prosperous sales abroad
due to their technological advances, were at stake.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Consequently, the first international agreements introduced national treatment as
the first step to ensure the same rights for foreign and domestic right holders (Scotchmer,
2004, p. 419).  The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, from its
adoption on 20 March 1883, covered patents and trademarks.  The Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, from its adoption on 9 September 1886, dealt
with copyrights and neighbouring rights.  Their attempts to harmonize and to constrain
national regulations were rather limited (Scotchmer, 2004,  p. 419).  In addition, their
membership did not exceed 20 members until the 1940s (Primo Braga and others, 2000, 
p. 11).
Since 1974, WIPO9 administered the growing number of multilateral conventions
and treaties.  According to the changing circumstances of international trade and
investment, WIPO provided a strengthened forum for the evolving system, including
step-by-step new IPRs or changed provisions resulting from new agreements.  The
membership of the revised Paris and Berne conventions grew to over 120 members up to
the 1980s (Primo Braga and others, 2000,  p.  11).  However, the system still had
shortcomings compared with the TRIPs Agreement:  first, each country had the choice of
which agreement of the WIPO system to join; second, for the members, the length of patent
protection and the exclusion of certain fields of technology were discretionary; and third,
institutional enforcement mechanisms in WIPO were weak.
In the 1980s, industrialized countries started to perceive that “inadequate
enforcement of IPRs in importing countries” was reducing “the competitive advantage of
their exporting firms” (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001,  p. 277).  As previously outlined,
global economic integration in terms of rising trade and investment along with the growing
importance of technology-intensive goods and innovation are the drivers for the
strengthening of cross-border intellectual property protection because of the objections of
the technology-exporting industries, mainly in industrialized economies, against the
existing international system.  Primo Braga (1996, p. 359) noted a “broad consensus” in the
literature that “the economic interests involved are significant”.
It is argued that the owners of IPRs in the developed countries, such as
pharmaceutical companies or the software industry, pushed their political interest
domestically, because they “wished to exploit their technical advantages on an international
scale and also to limit expropriation costs from potential rivals” (Maskus, 2000, pp. 83, 78-79;
Correa, 2000, p. 5).  As previously mentioned, national intellectual property regulation is
theoretically created to ensure innovation by allocating the privilege of monopoly to the
producers of knowledge at the expense of the consumers.  Two rather symmetrical interests
can also be found in the domestic political arena regarding cross-border intellectual
9 Founded in 1970, WIPO became a specialized United Nations agency in 1974 and it is a successor of the
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which was the international body for
overseeing the above-mentioned treaties on IPRs from the nineteenth century.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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property protection:  on the one hand, exporting industries of medium- and high-technology
goods want to capture profit abroad, and on the other, consumers are interested in fair
competition in the domestic market between foreign and domestic technology for high
quality and low prices (see Scotchmer, 2004, p. 415).  With a focus on the innovating export
industry and following the outlined economic rationale, it appears that Governments of
industrialized countries have to “transnationalize” intellectual property protection at the
expense of developing countries in order to secure the domestic production of knowledge.
Therefore, the traditional scope of intellectual property regulation within national borders
poses a dilemma to industrialized countries.
As shown, complementary to the influence of globalization on domestic policy
choices, the domestic arena of policymaking shapes the negotiating position of
industrialized countries and their unilateral and bilateral diplomacy with regard to
intellectual property protection.  While some texts tend to stress the direct influence of
interest groups on the TRIPs negotiation outcome, i.e., that captured by business interests.
With regard to the dilemma of governing IPRs, Scotchmer (2004, p.  416) offers an
explanation from a game-theoretical perspective, which emphasizes that cross-border IPR
enforcement is the prevailing national interest:
Capture is undoubtedly an important phenomenon, but I argue that intellectual
property policies can become overprotective even if trade negotiators are equally
concerned with all domestic interests, those of both consumers and producers.
This is because intellectual property is a tool by which cross-border externalities
can be recaptured by the innovating country.
The Government of the United States, the most prominent and activist among the
industrialized countries (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001,  p. 277), already had unilateral
instruments10 in place since the 1970s to force its trade partners to recognize its standards
of intellectual property protection, among which were import restrictions and other
sanctions against foreign Governments by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR).  Among the targets of unilateral actions were Argentina, Brazil,
China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand (Maskus, 2000, 
p. 4).  So-called unfair practices were filed by the USTR, and identified “prior” targets were
informed of deadlines for the removal of those practices.  For instance, tariffs on a strategic
selection of imported goods would be imposed if there was no response from the targeted
country.  The application use was so widespread that Canada, the European Community and
Brazil even filed complaints under the GATT dispute settlement mechanism concerning the
10 First, Section 337 of the 1930 United States Tariff Act was enacted by Congress to constrain imports, if
necessary; second, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act was targeted at foreign trade partners, as amended by
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.  Special 301 was dedicated to intellectual property cases.
It is widely acknowledged that those laws can be ascribed to interest groups lobbying in Congress
(see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 277-278).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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intellectual property-related sanctions of the United States (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, 
p. 279).
A second strategy was used by both the European Union and the United States:
new intellectual property laws, such as the 1996 European Union Directive on Databases,
included a condition of protection for non-nationals, under which the same law would have
to apply in the exporting country (Scotchmer, 2004,  p. 419).  A third approach is to
negotiate bilateral or regional intellectual property standards mostly in relation to free trade
agreements (FTAs), as outlined in the next section.
(b) The formation and implementation of the TRIPs Agreement:
commitments by the developing countries
IPRs were pushed on to the GATT agenda in the 1970s.  Provisions on
counterfeiting were subsequently adopted at the Tokyo round.  In 1986, the Punta del Este
Declaration acknowledged the need to clarify the Tokyo provisions (ICTSD and UNCTAD,
2003, p. 44).  In 1995, the TRIPs Agreement together with the WTO framework came into
force and established an unprecedented international regime on IPRs, because it includes
“minimum standards in virtually all areas of intellectual property protection” (Maskus,
2000,  p.  26), as well as directions for administration and enforcement for all WTO
members.
In recognition of the shortcomings of the WIPO system, Hoekman and Kostecki
(2001, p. 282) observed:  “A major attraction of the GATT was that it had an enforcement
mechanism”.  Besides the previously mentioned dispute settlement mechanism for
enforcement, GATT as a multilateral forum for trade negotiations, offered the industrialized
countries another crucial characteristic to foster the global strengthening of IPRs:  the
opportunity to offer incentives in other areas of the trade negotiations in return for the
commitments made by the developing countries.  In addition, GATT, and subsequently
WTO, also had been the best vehicle for establishing a truly global intellectual property
regime because of its ever-growing membership and the equally binding obligations of the
TRIPs Agreement for all members.11
The quid pro quo principle of trade negotiations thus offers a basis for why the
developing countries accepted such an enormous shift to a new regime, which included all
IPRs of WIPO, added new sui generis rights and imposed rules of administration and
enforcement.  A report of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
(ICTSD) and UNCTAD (2003, p. 44) highlights the contradiction:  in 1989, when resistance
to a substantial agreement on IPRs was dropped, some developing countries had just
enabled reforms of their patent systems to facilitate imitation.
11 Except for the time of implementation:  industrialized countries had 1 year, the developing countries and
economies in transition had 5 years, and the least developed countries had 11 years.  Formally, full
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement had to be completed by 2005 at the latest.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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The trade-off between different parts of the Uruguay Round “package deal” made
the TRIPs Agreement possible.  Developing countries hoped that the whole package
“would outweigh the economic and social costs” (ICTSD and UNCTAD, 2003,  p. 44).
Besides the removal of some of protectionist policies, such as in agriculture, substantial
commitments were made by industrialized countries concerning the phase-out of the
Multifibre Arrangement and the ban on voluntary export restraints.  Nevertheless, the
developing countries feared also that a refusal might lead to “unilateral arm-twisting” by the
United States and the European Union (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001,  p. 280), as had
already been experienced by some countries previously.
Some argue that the commitments of developing countries to reform their
intellectual property system saw hardly any compensation (Correa, 2000, p. 3; CIPR, 2003, 
p. 8).  However, ICTSD and UNCTAD (2003,  p. 45) noted that they still achieved
compromises in the TRIPs Agreement extending the transition periods, the scope for
national interpretation and a number of exclusions disliked by some TNCs and interest
groups.  Besides, domestic business interests existed also in oppositional countries, which
endorsed the steps forward, especially those in emerging economies that depended on FDI
or licensing for technology (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 280).
Nonetheless, the number of trade and patent applications indicates where
international intellectual property-related payments go:  Correa (2000, p. 5) for example,
refers to patent statistics in the United States, whereas in the period between 1977 and 1996
only 10 industrialized countries accounted for 95 per cent of the applications, but
developing countries accounted for less than 2 per cent of them.  Export numbers point to
the same situation:  the so-called Asian Tigers and Latin American countries together
accounted for 11 per cent of medium- and high-technology goods exported to the OECD
countries compared with 50.6 per cent of the countries in the Group of Seven (Correa,
2000, p. 5).  Maskus (2005, p. 45) stated:  “The United States remained, by far, the largest
recipient of such fees [related to licensing of patents, copyrights, etc.], earning a net $20.7
billion in 1995”.
(c) TRIPs Agreement as an international regime and its global impact
Theories of international relations offer useful insights in understanding the nature
of the new international intellectual property system and pointing out the impact of the
TRIPs Agreement.  As a multilateral agreement within the WTO context, the TRIPs
Agreement established a new regime for intellectual property protection.  The term
“regime” refers to a theoretical concept first coined by Krasner (1983, p. 2), who identified
international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations”.  Krasner (1983, pp. 4-5) illustrated his theory with reference to
GATT.  While GATT principles are based on liberal theoretical foundations, i.e., free tradeAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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as the raison d’être, their norms reflect standards of behaviour for the cooperating parties,
such as reciprocity and national treatment.  The rules work basically as norms on a less
general level; sometimes they mediate between conflicting principles and norms.12
The TRIPs Agreement represents one part of the trade regime established by
WTO.  Insufficient intellectual property protection was implicitly redefined as protectionist
behaviour, therefore conflicting with the free-trade principle of GATT/WTO.  However,
unlike the provisions on tariff and non-tariff barriers, the agreement establishes rules
directly governing national regulations on IPRs by specifying the rights, the duration and
the standards for enforcement and administration.  The underlying norm is national
treatment, which was already included in the WIPO system.  Within WTO, its provisions
have supranational effect, which means that, by signing and ratifying the agreement,
a Member State permits WTO and other members to control its compliance with the TRIPs
Agreement and permits the Dispute Settlement Body to impose sanctions in cases of
non-compliance.
Hoekman and Kostecki (2001,  p. 274) characterized the TRIPs Agreement as
“unique in the WTO context”, because “it imposes obligations upon Governments to adopt
a set of substantive rules in an area that traditionally has been regarded to be in the purview
of domestic regulation”.  Maskus (2000,  p. 2) came to a similar conclusion about the
significance of the TRIPs Agreement:  “It is the first multilateral trade accord that aims at
achieving partial harmonization in an extensive area of business regulation”.  As regards its
general implications, both texts share the view that the TRIPs Agreement forms the
“vanguard of efforts” (Maskus, 2000, p. 2) to include more regulatory policies in the WTO
context, establishing more “‘behind the border’ regulatory regimes” (Hoekman and
Kostecki, 2001,  p. 274).  Other agreements of the Uruguay round besides the TRIPs
Agreement also contain some provisions with a direct impact on parts of national
regulations, most prominently the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the
Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement), as Holmes (2004)
elaborated.
The nature or major characteristic and the impact of the agreement can therefore
be summarized as “harmonization of national intellectual property regulation”, because the
TRIPs Agreement (and similar parts of the TRIMs Agreement and GATS) implicitly
considers harmonization as a norm for the WTO agenda.  In effect, national intellectual
property systems had to be adapted to the specific provisions.  Correspondingly, the use of
bilateral pressure and FTAs is a part of the international IPRs regime, whereas
industrialized countries use their economic and political power (and bargaining power) to
shape the system of norms and rules according to their domestic demand (figure 2).
12 This would be the case for the rule on special and differential treatment, which allowed protectionism
depending on the country’s status as an LDC (Krasner, 1983, p. 4).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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General judgements on this development within the WTO framework are mixed.
For example, Guy de Jonquières (1998, cited in Holmes, 2004, p. 2) of the Financial Times
argues:  “As liberalization extends deeper into countries’ domestic economies, the opening
of markets increasingly requires global disciplines on national regulatory policies”.  The
economist Rodrik (1999, p. 148) draws a different conclusion and criticizes specifically the
TRIPs and TRIMs agreements as “cases of ‘forced’ harmonization”, because they
unnecessarily constrain policy choices in participating countries.  While Rodrik (1999, 
pp. 147-148) generally embraces better regulatory standards serving transparency, in his
view both agreements fail to present a solution for developing countries, which would
either improve economic performance or exhibit democratic legitimacy by avoiding
discrimination of social groups.
As for the case of bilateral pressure by industrializing countries, Rodrik’s
argument is strengthened, because the respective FTAs evidently represent specific interests
in IPR enforcement rather than good solutions for the trade partners.  The United States,
most prominently among other industrialized countries, uses FTAs as another channel of
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influence to expand national intellectual property regulation of trading partners beyond the
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement.  The World Bank (2005, p. 1) reports that the United
States trade diplomacy has undergone a “considerable shift” by introducing intellectual
property provisions as a “central element” into regional and bilateral FTAs.  Besides the
general trend towards bilateral and regional FTAs, the strategy is to enforce and even
extend  tête-à-tête what had been achieved in WTO since 1995.  As in the GATT
negotiations, the demand for stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement is
combined with incentives of preferential access to an attractive trade partner.
In the United States, the domestically perceived decline of competitiveness has led
to aggressive ways to secure the technological margin in the global economy.  The objective
is to achieve protection that “[…] reflects a standard of protection similar to that found in
the United States law”. (USTR, 2002, cited in World Bank, 2005, p. 1) Signatories of such
new FTAs have been Australia, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Singapore and
Viet Nam, among others (with different provisions on intellectual property protection),
using the quid pro quo approach of trade agreements for their own advantage.  The World
Bank (2005,  pp. 2-3) identifies some common elements in the provisions of respective
FTAs, which, for instance, affect exemptions of patent protection,13 constrain compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical patents, or special protection for pharmaceutical test data.  All
three reflect the existing but declining comparative advantage of the United States
pharmaceutical and medicine industry (Maskus, 2000, p. 78).
Both the TRIPs Agreement on a global level and FTAs in specific countries
achieved harmonization.  Intellectual property systems in developing countries have
undergone considerable changes since 1995.  Primo Braga (1996, p. 356) points out that
a look at some basic intellectual property law provisions shows that the “agreement will
require significant reforms in… legal regimes” concerning the protection in certain sectors
as well as protection periods (figure 3).
The respective institutional capacity for the implementation of the TRIPs
Agreement has always been a concern.  It is argued that judicial systems are already
overstretched (Primo Braga, 1996, p. 358).  Numbers estimated by the World Bank and
UNCTAD show that setup costs can reach millions of dollars, and annual costs such as in
Bangladesh can exceed $1 million each year (World Bank, 1999; UNCTAD, 1996, cited in
ICTSD and UNCTAD 2003, p. 50).  However, a look at what Holmes (2004, p. 27) calls
“wiggle room” emphasizes the options that States have for implementation.  For instance,
the breadth of a patent can be defined according to its own requirements, and approval for
patents from other countries can be denied if they are perceived as invalid (Holmes, 2004, 
p. 27).  Furthermore, strategic choices for national intellectual property systems are left, as
regards FTA negotiations, with industrialized countries as well as for further patent
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harmonization in relation to the Patent Cooperation Treaty of WIPO14 or the draft
substantive patent law treaty.  Nonetheless, the process of further, voluntary patent
harmonization has gained momentum, especially in the last few years, as the patent
statistics of WIPO show:  from 40,000 applications in 1995 to more than 120,000 in 2004
(2005, p. 3).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From a developing country’s perspective, implementation of the TRIPs Agreement
has imposed costs on a large scale, but not just in terms of its immediate implementation
and enforcement capacities.  The agreement also adjusts continuous transfer payments
directly and indirectly in terms of license fees and prohibiting imitation for industrial
development and for producing cheap consumer goods.  However, the impact of the TRIPs
Agreement goes further, as globalization generally constrains domestic policy choices for
economic policy, the TRIPs Agreement defines the scope and types of IPRs and dictates the
Figure 3.  Patent protection, 1994
Source: Recreated according to Carlos A. Primo Braga (1996).  “Trade-related intellectual property issues:
the Uruguay round agreement and its economic implications”, in Will Martin and L. Winters, eds., The Uruguay
Round and the Developing Countries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 357.
14 The treaty lowers considerably the transaction costs for patent protection in different regulatory environments,
because the treaty facilitates protection in multiple member countries with one application (Primo Braga,
1996, p. 360; Maskus, 2000, p. 67).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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rules for enforcement and administration in national intellectual property systems.  In 2005,
major changes in intellectual property systems in developing countries were mostly
finished, but the question whether or not the enforcement can be managed is left open.
Analysis of the preconditions and the characteristics of the international
intellectual property regime (consisting of the TRIPs Agreement in the WTO framework
and its parallel unilateral and bilateral attempts by industrialized countries) elaborates how
and why this unprecedented harmonization effort by the industrialized countries was made
feasible.  Discussion of the economic rationale and the political economy of intellectual
property protection made clear that industrialized countries faced a dilemma, as intellectual
property regulation coverage was traditionally within national borders but the innovating
industries increasingly exported and invested abroad.  Owing to the weaknesses of the
WIPO system, GATT/WTO offered the best institutional environment for cross-border
enforcement of IPRs.  The quid pro quo character of trade negotiations along with the
mixed positions led to a decline in resistance against such a far-reaching agreement among
the developing countries.
On the other hand, the WTO framework has been moved towards European
Union-style “deep integration” through the adjustment of national regulations to common
standards, most importantly with the TRIPs Agreement (see Holmes, 2004,  pp.  6-7).
Industrialized countries still seek to push the achieved harmonization beyond the provisions
of the TRIPs Agreement in order to protect their domestic intellectual property-related
interests.  Overall, through the TRIPs Agreement and secondary attempts, industrialized
countries were able to “transnationalize” their concept of intellectual property protection
and their high standards of protection according to their state of industrial development
rather than that of developing countries.
The emergence of the international intellectual property regime also comprises
implications for policymakers in developing countries that go beyond the commitment to
implement an international agreement.  It means that TNCs, the main actors in the global
production network and innovators in the knowledge-based economy, generally prefer
higher standards of intellectual property protection with regard to the relocation of
intellectual property-sensitive and technology-intensive parts of production.  For that
reason, ever-growing investments in R and D and shorter product cycles for staying on the
competitive edge have increased the willingness of TNCs to reap the rewards for
technological advance.  The internationalization of R and D shows that TNCs are
increasingly willing to relocate intellectual property-sensitive and vital parts of production
to developing countries.  The TRIPs Agreement might have paved the way by ensuring
respective protection standards; however, a comprehensive strategy for economic
development that integrates intellectual property regulation in a package of policies,
including education and general technology policies as well as proactive policies towards
FDI and trade, remains essential.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Structurally, developing countries played a passive role in both economic
integration, driven mainly by TNCs of industrialized countries, and the parallel political
integration in the context of GATT/WTO.  Nevertheless, as the trend of internationalization
of R and D illustrates, today’s global production networks offer an opportunity to benefit
from continuous production fragmentation as well as to participate even in the “production
of knowledge” in order to climb the technology ladder.  Furthermore, so-called wiggle room
is still left in the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement in order to adjust the national
intellectual property system to the individual situation, and States may choose whether to
finalize and ratify preferential trading arrangements which contain WTO plus intellectual
property provisions.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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